Educational Malpractice by Editors,
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959, Columbia University sued a student and his par-
ents to recover $1,000 for tuition owed to the university.' The
student filed a counterclaim demanding damages of $7,016, al-
leging that the university "had represented that it would teach
the defendant wisdom, truth, character, enlightenment, under-
standing, justice, liberty, honesty, courage, beauty and similar
virtues and qualities; that it would develop the whole man,
maturity, well-roundedness, objective thinking and the like; and
that because it failed to do so it was guilty of misrepresentation,
to defendant's pecuniary damage."'2 The trial court granted the
university's motion for summary judgment and was sustained on
appeal.3
In 1972, a young man with an average or above average IQ
and an average attendance record was graduated from a San
Francisco public high school after having attended San Francisco
public schools for twelve years. He had a reading ability of ap-
proximately fifth-grade level.4 During his period of attendance
in the San Francisco public schools, the student's parents attemp-
ted to obtain information about his educational progress and
were repeatedly assured that he was performing at or near grade
level. 5 The student, alleging that his inability to read and write
resulted from the negligence of his teachers and other school
district employees,6 sued the school district and its employees to
recover damages of over $500,000.7 The trial judge sustained a
demurrer to the complaint without opinion, and the case is now
on appeal.
I Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 574, 148 A.2d 63 (App.
Div.), aff'd, 31 N.J. 221, 156 A.2d 251 (1959).
2 Id. at 576, 148 A.2d at 64.
3
1d.
4 First Amended Complaint at 4-5, Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., No.
653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
5Id.
6 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Demurrer at 1, Doe v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist, No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. CL, Sept. 6, 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Plaintiff's Memorandum].
7 Complaint, supra note 4, at 17.
8 Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. CL, Sept. 6,
1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st Dist. CL App., Apr. 28, 1975.
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Although aspects of each of these suits may seem frivolous
or implausible, these cases raise the issue whether a student can
recover from a teacher, an administrator, a school, or school
district for his failure to learn because of teacher negligence or
incompetence. 9 This Comment will explore various theories
upon which a student might base such a suit. It will focus on the
public school context in order to allow the development of the
fullest range of legal theories and policy arguments and to pre-
sent most of the legal and policy objections that can be raised
against such a suit.
There is virtually no law in this area. The legal basis for this
kind of action will be constructed from general principles of tort
and contract law and by analogy to the law of professional mal-
practice. This Comment will outline a broad range of arguments,
will indicate the strengths and weaknesses of each argument, and
will suggest the situations in which each argument would be most
useful.
II. PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In the public school context, an action for failure to learn
addresses the general problem of providing a remedy to public
school students for the loss of educational benefits because
teachers negligently or intentionally failed to conform to
minimum standards of professional competence in the same or
similar communities.' 0 This loss of educational benefits results in
the harm of the failure of a student or class of students to attain
the educational level they probably would have attained had
their teacher performed at the required level. Such a suit does
not rest on the assumption that students will not learn at all
without teachers or even that teachers are the most significant
determinant of how much children learn." The harm that a suit
of this type could be brought to remedy is the loss of the differ-
ence a teacher makes in how much a student learns.
Because the standard to be applied is based on the mini-
mum acceptable level of competence existing within the com-
munity or comparable communities, such a suit is probably not
an effective approach to a general upgrading of education in a
'See Suing for Not Learning, TIME, Mar. 3, 1975, at 73, describing a University of
Bridgeport student's suit to recover tuition, the cost of books, driving expenses, and legal
fees. The student alleged that a required course was "worthless," that the school did not
provide the course described in the catalog, and that she did not learn anything.
10 See text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
" See generally C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972).
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community or to an equalization of per capita funding, teacher
quality, and facilities among different schools or communities. 12
In other words, a student could not bring an action for failure
to learn alleging that his school is inferior to one in a dissimilar
district, but such a suit might be brought, for example, by a
student or class of students in a prosperous community who fail
to reach the eightieth percentile in a particular subject or by
students in a poor school who are graduated from high school
reading at a third-grade level.' 3 In either situation, a student
may have been denied the benefit of minimally competent in-
struction and suffered the "harm" of not learning as much as he
would have if the teacher had been competent.
A. Remedies
At least three kinds of relief might be sought in the public
school context. A plaintiff might seek removal of an incompetent
teacher (and replacement with a competent teacher); provision
of, or payment for, remedial instruction; and/or monetary com-
pensation for diminished future income due, for example, to
plaintiff's relegation to menial employment because of his in-
ferior education.
Removal of an incompetent teacher has the advantage of
being relatively cost-free. Teacher contracts may contain a provi-
sion permitting dismissal "for cause," and a judicial finding of
negligence or incompetence might permit invocation of the
provision.' 4 Also, under the common law and/or statutes of most
states, teachers (including tenured teachers) can be dismissed for
incompetence.' 5 An injunction could be directed against either
school officials, ordering dismissal, or against the teacher, enjoin-
ing him or her from teaching. This remedy seems to be available
under the tort, contract, and possibly the mandamus theories
which will be developed later in this Comment.' 6 While dismissal
eliminates the possibility that the teacher will harm future stu-
dents, however, it does nothing to make whole those students
who have already been subjected to the teacher. This remedy
also does not seem suitable where the reasons for the negligent
performance are not of a continuing nature, that is, where there
12 For a brief discussion of approaches to these broader problems, see Ratner,
Remedying Failure to Teach Basic Skills, INEQUALITY IN EDUC., June 1974, at 15.
"a See text accompanying notes 94-104, 237-40 infra.
14See E. REUTTER & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 450 (1970).
15 Id.
16 See text accompanying notes 76-218 infra.
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is no strong likelihood that the teacher's performance will con-
tinue to be unsatisfactory.
Requiring a teacher, school, or school district to provide or
pay for remedial instruction sufficient to bring the plaintiff-
students up to the educational level they probably would have
attained if they had had a minimally competent teacher 17 has
several advantages. First, plaintiffs would, in most cases, be made
whole. Second, this remedy does not involve awarding "specula-
tive damages."'18 Third, given the probable infrequency of suc-
cessful suits under the standards developed in this Comment,
this remedy does not involve ruinous expense to the school
district.
In the case of students who have been out of school for a
number of years, remedial instruction might not fully compen-
sate the students for the loss suffered. Suppose, for example,
that the suit is based on the incompetence of an entire reading
staff. The students left school reading (on average) at the third-
grade level. With minimally competent instruction, they proba-
bly would have read at ninth-grade level.' 9 If these students have
suffered several years of diminished earnings because of their
lack of reading ability, remedial instruction alone will not pro-
vide compensation. In such a case, money damages for lost earn-
ings might be sought. Damages would amount to the difference
between plaintiff's actual earnings from the time of leaving de-
fendant school to the point at which remedial instruction cor-
rected the reading deficiency and his probable earnings during
the same period had he not had a "teacher-caused" educational
deficiency. 20 If the reading deficiency was never corrected, the
damages might be the total diminution of plaintiff's lifetime
earnings attributable to teacher negligence or incompetence.2'
In the case of someone who was denied promotion specifically
because of his "teacher-caused" educational'deficiency, and was
consequently relegated to an inferior position, damages might be
the difference between his projected life-time earnings at the
lower level and what he would have earned in the position he





20 Id. Presumably statistics correlating income and reading ability have been or could
be compiled. This kind of relief should be sought only where an entire reading or math
program was negligently taught, since it is doubtful that a single teacher's negligence
could substantially affect a student's earning capacity.
21 See Complaint, supra note 4, at 19. The amount of lost earnings may be calculable
on the basis of statistics comparing average lifetime earnings of people at one reading
level with the earnings of people reading on a higher level.
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was denied, or the difference in earnings during the period be-
tween the denial of promotion and remedy of the deficiency.22
Numerous objections can be raised to the demand and
award of monetary compensation for diminished earnings. First,
proof of harm on an individual basis would be difficult if not
impossible, even though the harm to the entire class might be
demonstrable.23 Second, in any individual case, even if harm is
proven, the precise amount of damages necessarily would be
speculative. Courts have refused to award damages which will
eventually be of a fixed amount and susceptible of precise com-
putation, but are nonascertainable at the time of trial.2 4 Third,
damages arguably should never exceed the combination of the
cost of remedial instruction and earnings lost during the period
of remedial instruction; before suffering an income loss, a plain-
tiff could have sought and paid for remedial instruction. Fail-
ure to have done so might be considered a negligent failure to
avoid or minimize damages, possibly barring recovery for the
avoidable damages. 25 Finally, the award of money damages for
diminished earnings could be a potentially crushing burden
upon a school district, especially in a class action. 26 In decid-
22 If the suit is brought under a contract theory, the damages recoverable would be
either compensation for detriment suffered (e.g., loss of earnings during the period a
student who decides not to drop out of school attends school) or loss of the expected
benefit of the bargain (e.g., diminished future income).
23 This greater ease in proving harm to the entire class would support a decision to
bring a class action. The other advantages of the class action for this type of suit are (1)
the reduced cost per student-plaintiff of a class action and (2) the increased possibility
that the publicity generated by a class action could provoke political, legislative, or ad-
ministrative action potentially more far-reaching than any judicially constructed remedy.
See Ratner, supra note 12, at 16, 21 & n.20. The disadvantage of a class action is that the
potential cost to the school district of a plaintiff's verdict and the antipathy and im-
patience that some judges feel toward class actions in general, e.g., Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974), may severely jeopardize chances of success on the liability issue.
24 E.g., Big Rock Mountain Corp. v. Stearns-Roger Corp., 388 F.2d 165, 170 (8th
Cir. 1968); Fireside Marshmallow Co. v. Frank Quinlan Constr. Co., 213 F.2d 16 (8th
Cir. 1954); Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 740
(1937) (court refused to award damages to Indian children for Government's breach of
treaty obligation to provide educational facilities and competent teachers, because
amount of damages could not be calculated with sufficient certainty). This dislike for
speculative damages contrasts with the willingness of courts to allowjuries to speculate on
the monetary value of pain and suffering, which will never be precisely calculable.
25 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 65, at 422-24 (4th ed. 1971).
This argument loses its strength in the context of a misrepresentation case in which the
plaintiff alleges, for example, that he was passed through every grade with satisfactory
reports and it was not until after graduation that he realized his deficiencies. See text
accompanying notes 169-81 infra; see generally W. PROSSER, supra § 110.
26 In Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975, damages
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ing whether to impose liability on the basis of legal theories
as novel as those upon which a plaintiff must rely in a suit
for failure to learn, a court would certainly consider the poten-
tial crippling effect of a large damage award on public educa-
tion. By demanding money damages for lost earnings, past
and future, a plaintiff might diminish his chances of success
on the basic liability issues. 27 It might, therefore, be advisable
either to bring a suit for money damages only where remedial
instruction would not be feasible, or to defer demands for
money damages for diminished earnings to suits brought after
liability has been established in suits for teacher dismissal
and remedial instruction.
In Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District, the plaintiff
sought money damages for mental distress, pain, and suffering
arising from his "teacher-caused" reading deficiency.28 Although
courts have recently recognized the intentional infliction of men-
tal distress as a basis for tort recovery,29 courts generally have
not permitted recovery for negligently inflicted mental distresss
without accompanying physical injury. 30 The demand in Doe
seems to go far beyond any recovery allowed by courts in negli-
gence suits, but it might be made more realistically in an inten-
tional tort action. 3' Even in the latter case, however, difficulties
of proof may make success on this demand highly unlikely;
moreover, seeking damages for mental distress may jeopardize
chances for success on the crucial liability question.
B. Policy
A student's suit for failure to learn because of teacher neg-
ligence or incompetence 32 cannot be won with formal legal ar-
guments alone. Part of any plaintiff's case will have to be social
policy arguments demonstrating why there should be liability.
Although the extent to which denial of education is an in-
jury cognizable in tort or contract is unclear, courts have recog-
nized the denial of education as a significant loss to a student.
33
for lost earnings, mental distress, and pain and suffering were calculated by the plaintiff
to be $500,000. Complaint, supra note 4, at 19.
27 Interview with John G. Harkins, Jr., prominent Philadelphia trial attorney, in
Philadelphia, Oct. 17, 1974.
28 Complaint, supra note 4, at 19. See generally Ratner, supra note 12, at 16-17.
'9 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 12.
30 Id. § 54, at 328-30.
31 See text accompanying notes 164-68 infra.
32 See text accompanying notes 69-218 infra.
33 Cf. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 740
(1937).
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As the Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Board of Education,34
Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for educa-
tion both demonstrate our recognition of the impor-
tance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is
the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.
35
Given the importance of education, lack of legal precedent
should not be determinative. In the past, courts have expanded
the tort law to create remedies for injuries not previously recog-
nized in tort. Prosser writes,
The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of
its development are never set. When it becomes clear
that the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protec-
tion against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact
that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar
to the remedy.3 6
Courts have imposed liability for the intentional infliction of
mental suffering,37 for injuries caused by defective products,38
for the infliction of prenatal injuries,39 and for other injuries
which do not fit into traditional tort categories. Thus if a plain-
tiff can convince a court that there should be liability as a matter
of policy, the absence of formal legal precedents should not bar
recovery in tort.
40
The primary function of the tort law is, as Prosser explains,
"the allocation of losses arising out of human activities .... In
34 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35 Id. at 493.
36 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
37 Id. § 12.
38Id. §§ 95-104.
39 Id. §§ 55.
4' For a model of how to fashion a new tort with a combination of policy and formal
legal arguments, see Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967).
See also W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at4 n.18, § 12, at 51.
4, W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at 6.
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deciding if there should be liability in an action for failure to
learn, we are deciding who should bear the educational "losses"
caused by teacher negligence or incompetence.
Punishment or retaliation has been suggested as one aim of
the tort law, that is, as one principle for deciding who should pay
for losses.4 2 If the cost of making whole the student who has
failed to learn because of teacher negligence is to be assigned in
accordance with a punishment or retaliation principle, a blame-
worthy teacher or school district should bear the loss rather than
the innocent student.
Some authorities suggest that losses should be assigned to
the party better able to bear the costs, or should be shifted to the
public at large. 43 A school district is obviously a better loss bearer
than an individual student because it can pass on the cost of
whatever remedy is awarded to the general public in the form of
increased taxes. Rather than raising taxes, however, a municipal-
ity might lower the overall quality of education to pay for a
major judgment in favor of a single student or class of students.
But even if this were the case, spreading the injury among all
students in the district or municipality is arguably more equitable
than leaving the entire burden on the student(s) who had the
misfortune of drawing an incompetent teacher. Furthermore,
just as school districts are able to obtain liability insurance to
cover physical injuries to students caused by the negligence of
school employees, they could probably obtain insurance against
the type of liability involved here, guaranteeing efficient cost
spreading.44 Even if, because of an immunity statute,45 the
school district is not held liable for the consequences of the
teacher's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior or
for its own negligence in hiring an incompetent teacher, mal-
practice insurance could be made available to teachers. The cost
of the insurance could be passed on to the public through the
mechanism of increased salaries paid with higher taxes.46 Thus,
the teacher himself appears to be a better risk bearer than the
student.
42 Id. § 4, at 23 & n.81.
" See id. 22 & n.69.
14 See Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 185, 202-03 (T.
Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960). Some cases and statutes now recognize that the availa-
bility of liability insurance eliminates the need to protect governments with immunity.
Johnston v. Girvin, 61 111. App. 2d 47, 208 N.E.2d 894 (1965); Thomas v. Broadlands
Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952); Vendrell v.
School Dist., 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961).
4 Notes 70-75 infra & accompanying text.
4 Cf. Proehl, supra note 44, at 202 & n.100.
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It has been suggested that imposing liability for a student's
failure to learn because of teacher negligence or incompetence
would render public education economically infeasible.47 For
three reasons, this concern may be unjustified. First, this objec-
tion is inapplicable to demands for dismissal of incompetent
teachers. Second, although a large class action suit would expose
a school district to a potentially crushing burden if damages for
prospective loss of income were awarded, the burden would not
be nearly as great if only provision of or payment for remedial
instruction were demanded. Third, since under the standards of
negligence suggested in this Comment4 8 a successful suit would
probably be rare, the school district or individual teacher might
be able to purchase insurance at a reasonable price.49
It is possible that the costs of compensating a class of stu-
dents or a single student for diminished income would, if prov-
able, be so potentially burdensome as to make success on the
liability question unlikely. If a damage judgment would substan-
tially reduce the quality of services that the school district could
provide, courts will most likely decide that the social need for
educational services outweighs the interest of any particular
plaintiff or class of plaintiffs in recovering for educational ben-
efits denied by teacher negligence.
An obvious benefit of imposing liability on teachers, school
officials, and school districts is the deterrence of negligent teach-
ing and the hiring of incompetent teachers. 50 Personal liability,
however, may also discourage people from becoming teachers.
51
Although the availability of malpractice insurance may substan-
tially eliminate fear of financial responsibility, it would not
eliminate the "chilling effect" on entry into the profession
generated by the fear of being disgraced in a courtroom by
public testimony of incompetence.
Furthermore, liability resulting in monetary damages or
dismissal may discourage the experimentation that leads to edu-
"' Demurrer of Defendants on First Amended Complaint at 17, Doe v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Defendants' Demurrer]. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 4, at 22-23.
Text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
See generally Proehl, supra note 44, at 202.
50 Cf. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968), in
which the California supreme court found this consideration persuasive: "An employee
in a private enterprise naturally gives some consideration to the potential liability of his
employer, and this attention unquestionably promotes careful work; the potential liability
of a governmental entity, to the extent that it affects primary conduct at all, will similarly
influence public employees." Id. at 792-93, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
" See Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 627, 657 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Professional Negligence].
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cational progress.52 This problem may be overcome by giving
parents the choice of putting their children in experimental clas-
ses; the doctrine of assumption of risk would then allow ex-
perimentation undeterred by the threat of damages or
dismissal. 53 The threat of liability would have the beneficial ef-
fect of inducing school officials and teachers to explain experi-
mental programs to parents and students in order to secure
formal and voluntary consent sufficient to establish assumption
of risk. Where, in the absence of formal consent, a teacher or
school official decides to deviate from conventional practices,
and, as a result, children suffer an educational loss, perhaps the
victims of the unsuccessful experiment should be compensated or
elevated to the educational level they probably would have at-
tained with conventional instruction.54 Depending on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, a successful suit need not re-
sult in an injunction against experimentation or dismissal of the
experimenting teacher. Payment for the costs of the unsuccessful
experiment may, in many cases, be sufficient.
55
It might be argued that other, non-judicial mechanisms,
such as political action, certification procedures, supervisory con-
trol, and professional review, are adequate to prevent or deter
teacher negligence. 56 But to the extent that an educational mal-
practice suit has a basis in fact, these other mechanisms have
been inadequate to prevent teacher negligence. In addition,
most other procedures provide only prospective relief and none
of them "make Whole" students who have already been injured
by teacher negligence. 57 Professional review boards have been
suggested as a cheaper and more efficient way of enforcing pro-
fessional standards and compensating individuals than the civil
lawsuit. 58 Although fashioning an alternative compensation pro-
cedure may be desirable to eliminate the problems inherent in
litigation-a slow, costly, and inefficient route59-the shortcom-
ings of the judicial process are not a valid reason to deny recov-
ery in a lawsuit.
52 Cf. Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 238 &
n.142 (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
53 School districts might try to take advantage of this defense by requiring parents to
sign a blanket waiver when their children enter kindergarten. It is far from certain,
however, that such a waiver would be enforced. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386-403, 161 A.2d 69, 84-95 (1960).
54 See text accompanying notes 219-40 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 252-55 infra.
56 See, e.g., Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 17-18.
17 See Sax & Hiestand, supra note 40, at 885-86.
58 Professional Negligence, supra note 56, at 688-89.
'9 See Sax & Hiestand, supra note 40, at 875.
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Another argument against recognition of a cause of action
for failure to learn because of teacher negligence or incompe-
tence focuses on the administrative inconvenience which might
be caused by a "flood of litigation" involving difficult problems
of proof. Various authorities, however, have rejected this argu-
ment as a legitimate reason for denying liability when genuine
and serious injuries have occurred.60 For example, Prosser
writes, "It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that de-
serve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation' and it is a
pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of
justice to deny relief on such grounds."' 6 1 Moreover, problems of
proof may be no more insurmountable than those involved in
other kinds of lawsuits that are presently recognized, 62 and,
under the standards of negligence outlined in this Comment,63 a
"flood of litigation" is unlikely.
In Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District,64 defendants
argued that the "social importance" of free, universal public
education should bar recovery for negligence. 65 This argument
has not prevented courts from holding school districts liable for
physical injuries caused by teacher negligence, 66 and the courts
have generally declined to allow the importance of a public func-
tion to determine whether tort liability for negligent perfor-
mance exists.6 7 Furthermore, if the costs of liability would not
make public education economically infeasible (a factual ques-
tion), there is no logical reason why the importance of public
education should imply immunity.
In assessing the possible objections to recognizing this cause
of action, the following observation of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court should be kept in mind:
Throughout the entire history of the law, legal
Jeremiahs have moaned that if financial responsibility
60 E.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); see
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 12, at 51 & n.38.
61 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 12, at 51.
62 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
63 Text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
64 No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st
Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975.
65 Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 17.
66 E.g., Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 73 P.2d 596 (1937), aff'd on
rehearing, 11 Cal.2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938); Gardner v. State, 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d
344 (1939).
6 E.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). But
see Lipman v. Brisbone Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1961).
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were imposed in the accomplishment of certain enter-
prises, the ensuing litigation would be great, chaos
would reign and civilization would stand still. It was
argued that if railroads had to be responsible for their
acts of negligence, no company could possibly run
trains; if turnpike companies had to pay for harm done
through negligence, no roads would be built; if
municipalities were to be financially liable for damage
done by their motor vehicles, their treasuries would be
depleted. Nevertheless, liability has been imposed in ac-
cordance with elementary rules of justice and the moral
code, and civilization in consequence, has not been




No reported case has allowed public school students to re-
cover for the loss of educational benefits because of teacher neg-
ligence or incompetence. The legal bases for such an action must
be created by analogy from the law of malpractice and by a
somewhat novel application of general principles of tort and
contract law. Although any law student can raise objections to
each of the legal theories that will be outlined, the analysis that
follows may give a judge a legal formula with which to explain a
policy-based plaintiff's decision. A plaintiff's verdict would in
fact be a recognition of a new tort or contract cause of action,
but the framing of the suit in familiar language would increase a
court's receptiveness by making such a verdict appear less
radical.
69
In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff's task may be made much
more difficult by continued adherence to the doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity from tort liability. 70 The extent to which
the doctrine would bar an action of this type varies greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Where the doctrine is applied most
broadly, teachers, school officials, and school districts have been
held immune from liability for students' injuries caused by the
68 Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 218-19, 199 A.2d 875, 884
(1964).
69 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 6, at 27.
" See Memorandum of Defendants at 3, McNeil v. Board of Educ., Civil No.
L-17297-74 (N.J. Super. Ct., Essex County, filed Jan. 15, 1975), arguing that sovereign
immunity should bar a former student's suit against a school board for the school
system's alleged negligent failure to deal adequately with his reading and visual disability.
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 25, §§ 131-32; Proehl, supra note 44, at 185-86,
202-04.
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negligent acts and omissions of teachers or school officials. 71
Unquestionably, jurisdictions that bar liability for physical in-
juries would not allow liability for students' failure to learn. In
some states, governmental immunity extends to school districts
and officials but not to teachers.7 2 In other states, school districts
are liable for injuries caused by the negligent acts and omissions
of their teachers to the extent of the district's liability insurance
coverage. 73 In still other states, the doctrine of governmental
immunity has been generally abrogated and exists only where
immunity is specifically provided for by statute;7 4 in these states
the teacher and the school district will generally be liable for
injuries caused by the teacher's negligence. It suffices to point
out that in at least some jurisdictions the doctrine does not abso-
lutely bar actions against teachers, schools, and school districts to
recover for injuries to students caused by teacher negligence,
and that authorities have contended, as a matter of policy, that
immunity doctrines should not insulate school districts, officials,
and teachers from tort liability where liability insurance is availa-
ble at non-crippling rates.
75
1. Tort Theories
Three broad areas of tort law are relevant to a cause of
action for failure to learn because of teacher incompetence: neg-
ligence, intentional tort, and misrepresentation (deceit and neg-
ligent misrepresentation).
a. Negligence
Section 328 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth
the essential elements of a negligence suit:
In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden
of proving
(a) facts which give rise to a legal duty on the part of the
defendant to conform to the standard of conduct estab-
"1E.g., Carroll v. Lucas, 39 Ohio Misc. 5, 313 N.E.2d 864 (C.P. 1974) (suit can be
brought only with specific statutory authorization).
72 E.g., Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 271 A.2d 547 (1970).
7See Johnston v. Girvin, 61 111. App. 2d 47, 208 N.E.2d 894 (1965); Thomas v.
Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952);
Vendrell v. School Dist., 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961). But see Niedfelt v. Joint
School Dist., 23 Wis. 2d 641, 127 N.W.2d 800 (1964).
7
4 See, e.g., Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795
(1962).
75 See, e.g., Duncan v. Koustenis, 26 Md. 98, 271 A.2d 547 (1970); Proehl, supra note
44, at 202-03.
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lished by law for the protection of the plaintiff,
(b) failure of the defendant to conform to the standard
of conduct,
(c) that such failure is a legal cause of the harm suffered
by the plaintiff, and
(d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind
legally compensable by damages.
76
Phrased differently, these elements are (1) a negligent act or
omission, (2) a legally recognized harm, (3) cause in fact, (4)
proximate cause, and (5) duty.
7 7
A suit against a teacher to recover damages for a student's
failure to learn because of teacher incompetence can easily be
framed in the language of a typical negligence suit.78 At the very
least, the plaintiff's case would involve establishing that the
student's failure to learn is a "harm ' 79 cognizable in tort, that the
teacher was negligent,80 that "but for" that negligence the stu-
dent would not have suffered this harm,"1 and that the teacher
had a duty to teach the student non-negligently.8 2 Proximate
cause is self-evidently present under most interpretations of the
term.8 3 A student's failure to learn is clearly among the foresee-
able risks of a teacher's poor classroom methods, thus satisfying
one formulation of the term.8 4 Under the second major in-
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
7 It is recognized that "duty," in this case duty to teach non-negligently, is a conclu-
sory term. It is not clear whether it has a meaning independent of the concepts of
negligence and proximate cause. Prosser writes:
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question-whether
the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's
conduct.... It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to
analysis in itself.... [I]t should be recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct in
itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 53, at 325-26 (footnotes omitted). Nonetheless, this Com-
ment will retain the term, since it is used by the judges whom the following arguments
are intended to persuade.
78 See Complaint, supra note 4, at 6-8.
79 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
80 Text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
81 Text accompanying notes 219-36 infra.
82 Text accompanying notes 105-63 infra.
83 The defendants in Doe v. San Francisco School Dist., No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, Ist Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975, con-
ceded this point. See Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 14.
84 The area within which liability is imposed is that which is within the circle of
reasonable foreseeability using the original point at which the negligent act was
committed or became operative, and thence looking in every direction as the
semi-diameters of the circle, and those injuries which from this point could or
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terpretation, proximate cause exists because a student's failure to
learn is a direct consequence of the teacher's incompetent
teaching. 85 Unlike many novel tort claims, this type of suit does
not involve injuries of a remote or unforeseeable character.
Assuming that the plaintiff is not barred by governmental
immunity, 86 the liability of the school district or municipality
could be asserted under at least two theories. First, the doctrine
of respondeat superior (either common law or statutory) may ren-
der the school district or municipality vicariously liable for the
negligent acts and omissions of its teacher/employees. 87 In some
jurisdictions where the doctrine is not available, the teacher may
have a statutory right to indemnification for losses incurred in a
negligence judgment arising out of the teacher's employment.
88
Second, the doctrine of respondeat superior may be invoked to
render the school district liable for the negligence of its officials
in hiring an incompetent teacher 89-an act that was the cause
in fact of the student's educational loss. 90 Proximate cause would
not be an obstacle, since the failure of the student to learn is
clearly a direct and foreseeable consequence of the hiring of an
incompetent teacher. Moreover, cases involving recovery for
physical injuries caused by teacher negligence have shown that a
court is more likely to find for the plaintiff on the liability issue if
there is a legal basis for either the direct or derivative liability of
the school district.9 '
Presumably, the usual tort defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk would be available. The methods
of proof suggested in this Comment, however, may eliminate
should have been reasonably foreseen as something likely to happen, are within
the field of liability, while those which, although foreseeable, were foreseeable
only as remote possibilities, those only slightly probable, are beyond and not
within the circle, -in all of which time, place and circumstance play their re-
spective and important parts.
Mauney v. Gulf Ref. Co., 193 Miss. 421, 428-29, 9 So.2d 780, 781 (1942).
s5 " 'Direct' consequences are those which follow in sequence from the effect of the
defendant's act upon conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time,
without the intervention of any external forces which come into active operation later."
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 43, at 263-64 (footnote omitted). See generally id. 251-70.
86 See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
8 7 E.g., Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 73 P.2d 596 (1937), aff'd on
rehearing, 11 Cal. 2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938); Cherney v. Board of Educ., 31 App. Div.
2d 764, 297 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1969); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
" See, e.g., N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3023 (McKinney 1970); Proehl, supra note 44, at 203.
89 See Proehl, supra note 44, at 202.
90 See, e.g., Engel v. Gosper, 71 N.J. Super. 573, 177 A.2d 595 (Super. Ct. 1962);
Kolar v. Union Free School Dist., 8 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Madison County Ct. 1939).
91 Proehl, supra note 44, at 215-16.
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the factual basis for a contributory negligence defense.92 In
some jurisdictions, the availability of both these defenses may
be limited by precedent or statute making it impossible for
a child below a certain age to be contributorily negligent or as-
sume the risk.93
(i) Negligence-The Standard
Professional liability cases within and without the education
area suggest the standard by which teachers' professional con-
duct should be judged:94 They "must have the skill and learning
commonly possessed by members of the profession in good
standing."95 In most states, this standard depends on where the
defendant practices; usually he will be required to exercise only
that degree of skill and training ordinarily possessed by mem-
bers of the profession in his own or similar communities.9 6 When
members of the profession disagree about which practices or
procedures are correct, the professional will usually be judged by
the school of thought to which he adheres, provided the school is
"a recognized one with definite principles, and it must be the
line of thought of at least a respectable minority of the
profession.
97
Thus, a professional will be judged not by the "reasonable
man" standard applied in ordinary negligence cases, but by
comparison with his professional peers. In an ordinary negli-
gence case, the jury may find that a defendant who conformed
to the normal or average conduct of the community was none-
theless negligent. In a professional malpractice case, conform-
ity to the norm or minimum of the professional community
is by definition non-negligent, even though the jury may be-
lieve that the community norm or minimum is too low.9 8 This
comparative standard, holding teachers to only a community
norm or minimum, should keep the number of educational mal -
practice suits within reasonable limits.
92 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
93 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 32, at 156-57, § 65, at 419 & n.31, § 68, at 447 &
n.82.
94 See generally PROFESSIONAL NEGLGENCE (R. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
95 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 32, at 162; accord, RESTATENMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 299A (1965); Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 633.
96 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 32, at 164.
91 Id. 163; accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, commentf at 75 (1965).
9 But see Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 639, arguing that the community
standard has been limited and that a minimum level of competence may be required
regardless of the level of the community.
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Indeed, this definition of negligence is probably under-
inclusive, because, especially in poor schools, the minimum level
of teaching may be so low that many incompetent teachers will
inevitably be deemed non-negligent. This standard therefore
negates the possibility of using a negligence suit to achieve a
general upgrading of ghetto eduication; the performance of the
majority of ghetto schools and teachers will be, by definition,
within the minimum standards of the professional community by
which the teacher's performance is evaluated. It is not clear,
however, that a negligence action is the appropriate legal base
for a general attack upon low quality education. Applying the
minimum standards of the professional community, a negligence
action will at least provide a remedy for the very worst cases.
In suits against teachers to recover for physical injuries
caused by inadequate teacher supervision, the conduct of the
teacher has been judged by the usual tort standard of care-that
of a "reasonable and prudent person acting under like
circumstances." 99 But in suits to recover for physical injuries to
students caused by negligent instruction, the standard of negli-
gence usually applied is similar to the general professional stan-
dard stated above. 100 In a suit to recover for a student's failure to
learn because of teacher negligence, the standard of acceptable
instruction should be comparative, that is, the level of skill and
learning of the minimally acceptable teacher in the same or simi-
lar communities.' 0 ' Unlike the supervision cases, this kind of suit
may require a jury to evaluate the professional methods em-
ployed by the teacher, and the general professional standard is
more suitable than the "reasonable man" standard for evaluating
exercises of professional discretion and judgment. 0 2 In addi-
tion, this standard will not inhibit the adoption of new teaching
methods which have won acceptance by "a respectable minority
of the profession."
Section 308 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests the
99 Proehl, supra note 44, at 204-07.
100 E.g., Gardner v. State, 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939).
101 As Prosser notes, it is misleading to say that the appropriate standard is the level
of skill and learning possessed by the average member of the profession: "only those in
good professional standing are to be considered; and of these it is not the middle but the
minimum common skill which is to be looked to." W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 32, at 163.
It would be especially unwise to apply an "average" standard in a suit to recover for
negligent instruction, because such a standard would define a large number of teachers
as negligent. The standard of the minimally acceptable teacher is much more likely to
receive judicial acceptance.
102 See Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 643-44.
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proper standard for determining the negligence of school offi-
cials who hire incompetent teachers:
It is negligence to permit a third person to... engage
in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if
the actor knows or should know that the person intends
or is likely. . . to conduct himself in the activity in such
a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to
others."10
3
Under this standard, a school official would be liable for hiring a
teacher he knew or should have known was incompetent or
likely to teach negligently. Adoption of the "known or should
have known" standard for school officials would likely have the
beneficial effect of closer supervision of the classroom and the
results produced in the classroom.
Proof of negligence, as will be explained, may involve expert
testimony, evidence of failure to adhere to statutorily prescribed




Various statutory, common law, and scholarly authorities
support the contention that school districts and teachers should
be held liable for the failure of students to learn because of the
negligence of the teacher. These authorities affirm the existence
of a duty of non-negligent instruction and the cognizability in
tort of this type of harm.
Courts in many jurisdictions have held teachers and school
districts liable for physical injuries to students caused by negli-
gent conduct within the scope of the teacher's employment.
10 5
Typical teacher negligence cases involve injuries arising from a
lack of adequate teacher supervision.10 6 In these cases, the teach-
er has been held to the standard of a "reasonable and prudent
person acting under like circumstances."'1 7 Although under
most circumstances a person does not have a duty to take affir-
mative action to protect others from a risk of harm which the
person did not create, a special relationship between the parties,
including the student-teacher relationship, has given rise to
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965).
104 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra; W. PROSSER, supra note 25, §§ 37-40.
105 See Proehl, supra note 44.
106 See id. 204-07.
107 Id. 201.
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such a duty.10 8 These cases support the general notion that a
teacher may be liable to students for the foreseeable conse-
quences of his negligent teaching. 10 9
Another important line of cases has found liability where a
student suffers physical injury because he was negligently in-
structed by a gym teacher. In Gardner v. State," 0 for example,
the state of New York was held liable for injuries sustained by a
student attempting to perform a gymnastic stunt proximately
caused by the failure of the gym teacher to follow customary
methods of instruction. In a New Jersey case, the court upheld
the legal sufficiency of the complaint in a suit against two science
teachers and the school board to recover for a student's injuries
and eventual death caused in part by the negligent failure of the
teachers properly to instruct the student in the use of rockets."'
These cases, recognizing the legal duty of teachers to adhere to
professionally acceptable (non-negligent) methods of instruc-
tion, 1 2 are precedent for judicial evaluation of teaching quality
and for the liability of teachers and their employers for the con-
sequences of negligent instruction.
One might contend that this duty of non-negligent in-
struction exists only where the consequences of negligent in-
struction involve a risk of serious physical injury. Preventing
failure of a student to learn, however, is arguably no less impor-
tant than preventing physical injuries;" 3 moreover, the tort law
does not recompense only physical injuries. 1 4 Defamation, inva-
sion of privacy, unfair competition, and legal malpractice are
some areas of tort law where recovery is permitted for non-
10 8 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 341-42, 348-49.
109 Cf., e.g., Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Proehl, supra note 44, at 190 n.2 7 .
110 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939); see Bellman v. San Francisco High School
Dist., 73 P.2d 596 (1937), aff'd on rehearing, 11 Cal. 2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938); Smith v.
Consolidated School Dist., 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1966); Keesee v. Board of Educ., 37 Misc.
2d 414, 235 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
"I Engel v. Gosper, 71 N.J. Super. 573, 177 A.2d 595 (Super. Ct. 1962). The bases
for the school board's liability were the doctrine of respondeat superior and negligence in
hiring unsuitable teachers. See also Klenzendorf v. Shasta Union High School Dist., 4 Cal.
App. 2d 164, 40 P.2d 878 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
112 Curran, Professional Negligence--Some General Comments, in PROFESSIONAL
NEGLIGENCE 4 (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960); accord, Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 643 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299 A &
coment c at 73-74 (1965). Another way to describe the "duty" to which the professional
relationship gives rise is that conformity to the standards of the profession is an implicit
term of the contract that arises between the professional and his client, patient, student,
etc. See Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 679; text accompanying note 183 infra.
113 See text accompanying notes 33-40 supra.
114 See generally Sax & Hiestand, supra note 40, at 879-86.
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physical injuries. 1 15 In the education context, courts have held
school authorities liable for the intentional infliction of mental
distress on a student."1
6
Both Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts assert that
when someone undertakes to render a service to another upon
which the other relies, the actor assumes a duty to act non-
negligently and will be liable for harm that results from negli-
gent performance. 1 17 Prosser writes, "Where performance
clearly has been begun, there is no doubt that there is a duty of
care.""18 Applied to education, this formulation suggests that
once a teacher, school, and school district undertake to provide
education, they assume a duty to educate non-negligently. This
general principle of voluntary assumption of duty has been ap-
plied specifically to government undertakings in a variety of
cases. Indian Towing Co. v. United States 1 9 expresses the notion
that the government will be liable for providing a service in a
negligent manner, even though it was under no obligation to
provide the service at all. This case held that when the Coast
Guard exercised its discretion to operate a lighthouse, it was
liable for damages resulting from the negligent failure to keep
the light in good working order. In a California case, a county
sheriff who made a gratuitous promise to warn the plaintiff of
the release of a dangerous prisoner was held liable for injuries
sustained by the plaintiff when the sheriff negligently failed to
give the warning.12 0 Another California case held that the owner
of a boat marina could bring an action against the state for
damages resulting from the negligent preparation and release of
weather and flood information. 12 Similarly, when the state and
its employees undertake to provide education, they assume a
duty to do so non-negligently.
22
115 See W. PROSSER, SUpra note 25, § 1, at 2-3, §§ 111-17, 130.
116 See, e.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
117 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 343-48; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
323 & comment e at 139 (1965).
"18 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 346.
119 350 U.S. 61 (1955); accord, Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); Armiger v. United States, 339 F.2d 625 (Ct. Cl.
1964).
Indian Towing Co. also supports the contention that a plaintiff can recover for the
denial of a benefit which he would have enjoyed but for the defendant's negligence. See
text accompanying notes 127-36 infra. See also Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16
(1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 740 (1937).
120 Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
121 Connelly v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
122 The applicability of the cases cited in notes 113-16 supra may be qualified by the
1976] EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 775
A plaintiff in an educational malpractice suit, however, will
probably have to deal with a line of cases headed by H. R. Moch
Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.' 23 In Moch, a plaintiff was denied
recovery against a water company, under contract with the city
to provide water, which negligently failed to provide adequate
water to extinguish a fire before it reached and destroyed the
plaintiff's warehouse. The court held, inter alia, that the suit was
not maintainable as an action for a common law tort.1 24 Al-
though acknowledging that one who undertakes to act, even
gratuitously, has a duty to act non-negligently, Judge Cardozo
wrote,
If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inac-
tion would commonly result, not negatively merely in
withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in work-
ing an injury, there exists a relation out of which arises
a duty to go forward .... The query always is whether
the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a point as
to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or has
stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to become
an instrument for good.'
25
Cardozo characterized the failure to furnish an adequate supply
of water as a denial of a benefit not the commission of a
wrong.
126
Moch could be troublesome for a plaintiff in an educational
malpractice case; it has been argued that the failure of a student
to learn because of teacher negligence or intentional misconduct
is not an injury cognizable in tort-that it is not an injury at all,
but rather the loss of an expectancy or failure to receive a
benefit.' 27 In other kinds of cases, however, plaintiffs have re-
covered in tort for a variety of injuries which might be called lost
expectancies or benefits. Legal malpractice cases, for example,
have allowed plaintiffs to recover for benefits that they probably
would have received under wills or from lawsuits but for the
negligence of a lawyer.' 28 Plaintiffs have also been recompensed
governmental immunity doctrines of the particular jurisdiction. Text accompanying
notes 70-75 supra.
123 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); see Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d
486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952); Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d
325 (1952).
124 247 N.Y. at 167, 159 N.E. at 898.
12- Id. at 167-68, 159 N.E. at 898.
12
6 Id. at 169, 159 N.E. at 899.
127 Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 44-46.
128 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
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for tortious interference with the expectation of business
profits.129 The Restatement of Torts explains that "[w]here a per-
son can prove that but for the tortious interference of another,
he would have received a gift or a specific profit from a transac-
tion, he is entitled to full damages for the loss which has thus
been caused to him . . . ,,130 Recovery usually has been denied,
according to Prosser, in cases in which there was no sufficient
degree of certainty that the anticipated benefit would have been
received, and such cases do not deny the existence of tort
liability.' 31 Courts have allowed recovery where the receipt of the
benefits was not certain but only highly probable. Furthermore,
it has been argued that plaintiffs should be allowed to recover
for the lost chance of receiving a benefit, the degree of certainty
being relevant only to valuation of the loss.' 32
Plaintiffs are also likely to recover for benefits denied be-
cause of the negligence of the person who seeks to bestow the
benefit. For example, a rescuer who abandons or negligently
performs a rescue is liable for resulting injury.' 33 Indeed, Pros-
ser asserts that recovery for a denied benefit is highly probable
even in the absence of evidence that the defendant's action de-
prived the plaintiff of assistance from someone else:
It seems very unlikely that any court will ever hold that
one who has begun to pull a drowing man out of the
river after he has caught hold of the rope is free, with-
out good reason, to abandon the attempt, walk away
and let him drown, merely because he was already in
extremis before the effort was begun.'
34
The plaintiff's reliance and forbearance from seeking
other services significantly strengthen an attempt to recover for
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 130, at 949-54; Wade, supra
note 52, at 234 n.19.
129 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 130, at 950.
130 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 912, commentf at 584 (1939). See also Kely v. Price, 27
Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972). But see H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
" W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 130, at 950-51.
132 Id. 951 & n.75. In Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16 (1936), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 740 (1937), the court recognized that Indian children who had been denied
educational benefits, which the Government should have provided under the terms of a
treaty, had suffered a substantial loss. Yet the court denied recovery because the mone-
tary value of the loss could not be calculated with sufficient certainty and exactitude.
133 
See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 343-44; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 324 A (1965).
134 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 348.
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the denial of benefits. 135 Thus, it seems that the strongest case
would be, for example, one in which the plaintiff's parents were
considering sending him or her to a private school, but, after
receiving assurances from the principal, school officials, and
teachers that instruction in the public school would be compe-
tent, decided to send their child to the public school. As a result
of negligent instruction, the student failed to attain as high an
educational level as he would have attained in a non-negligently
taught class.' 36 Characterizing the student's failure to learn as a
lost benefit or expectation would not seem, at least under these
circumstances, to preclude recovery.
Because the viability of the Moch distinction between denial
of a benefit and commission of a wrong in tort actions is consid-
erably undermined by the foregoing considerations and prece-
dents, Moch is not followed in all jurisdictions. In 1964, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania lheld that a complaint was
sufficient in alleging that the plaintiff's house burned down
because the water company, under contract with the city to pro-
vide water and maintain fire hydrants, had been negligent in
maintaining the hydrant system.' 37 The Pennsylvania court
wrote of Moch,
Once Justice Cardozo recognized that the defendant
was guilty of a "negligent omission," he admitted that
the defendant had committed a breach of duty since
negligence is defined in law as a breach of duty. If there
was no breach of duty on the part of the defendant, its
conduct could be not characterized as a negligent omis-
sion, but would be merely an omission that did not
amount to negligence.' 3
8
Even jurisdictions that follow Moch may not in fact be doing
so in such a way as to impede school/teacher liability. In Reimann
v. Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 139 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey followed the Moch rule enunciating a policy basis, how-
ever, which suggests that the rule should not bar a suit for a
student's failure to learn because of teacher negligence or in-
competence. The court suggested that the availability of fire in-
35 Id. 343-48.
136 This also might be argued under a contract theory. See notes 181-207 infra &
accompanying text.
137 Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964). See also
Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961).
138 Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 214, 199 A.2d 875, 882 (1964).
139 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952).
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surance supports placing the loss on the property owner rather
than the water company. 140 Students, however, cannot purchase
insurance against their failure to learn. Indeed, the availability of
liability insurance for teachers and school districts and the prob-
able infrequency of educational malpractice suits undercut one
of the primary policy reasons for denying liability in Moch-the
fear of imposing a potentially limitless burden on suppliers of
important public services.
1 41
The duty arising from the control of the conduct of others
provides another basis for the liability of school districts and
officials for the educational harms caused by teachers who
negligently or intentionally 142 fail to meet minimum professional
standards. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily
takes the custody of another under circumstances such
as to ... subject him to association with persons likely to
harm him, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so
to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent
them from intentionally harming the other or so con-
ducting themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of
harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control the conduct of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and op-
portunity for exercising such control.
43
These principles suggest that school officials should be liable if
they subject students to instruction by teachers whom they knew
or should have known were incompetent.
144
Statutorily imposed obligations may also be used to establish
the duty necessary for recovery on a negligence theory. 145 In
fact, in cases where tort liability is based on a statutory violation,
the courts may be more willing to allow non-traditional damage
claims than in common law tort actions. For example, section
815.6 of the California Government Code provides:
140 Id. at 139, 87 A.2d at 327.
141 H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 165-66, 159 N.E. 896,
897-98 (1928); see generally text accompanying notes 43-50, 65-68 supra.
142 Text accompanying notes 164-69 infra.
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965); accord, W. PROSSER, supra note 25,
§ 56, at 349-50.
144 As will be explained, these principles should also apply where a school official
knew or should have known that a teacher would intentionally fail to teach according to
minimum professional standards, e.g., because of racial bias. Notes 164-69 infra & ac-
companying text.
145 See generally Sax & Hiestand, supra note 40, at 914 & n.180.
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Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty im-
posed by an enactment that is designed to protect
against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public
entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately
caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the
public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable
diligence to discharge the duty.1 46
The California supreme court ruled in Ranos v. County of
Madera147 that a county welfare department could be liable
under section 815.6 for coercing minors to work under threat of
losing the benefits of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, 148 in violation of various regulations and statutes. In
Bradford v. State,149 that court held that the state could be liable
under section 815.6 for negligent failure to record the dismissal
of criminal charges against an individual as required by statute.
The plaintiff in Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District'5"
invoked educational statutes to support the imposition of tort
liability for negligent teaching under section 815.6.'5 The vari-
ous statutory provisions prescribe duties designed to protect stu-
dents from the risk of not learning, and the plaintiff alleged that
the defendants' failure to perform these duties resulted in the
plaintiff's failure to learn. For example, plaintiff alleged viola-
tion of section 8573 of the California Education Code, which pro-
vides that "[n]o pupil shall receive a diploma of graduation from
grade 12 who has not completed the course of study and met the
standards of proficiency prescribed by the governing board." 52
The defendants allegedly violated other statutory duties to keep
parents accurately informed about the educational progress of
their children, 53 to provide a course of study designed to fit the
needs of the pupils for whom the course of study was
prescribed, 154 to evaluate and revise the school district's educa-
146 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1966).
147 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971). See also Elton v. County of
Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
148 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970), as amended, (Supp. I1, 1973).
149 36 Cal. App. 3d 16, 111 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
"I No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st
Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975).
151 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 21-23.
152 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8573 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
21 n.12.
153 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
21 n.ll.
"5 CAL EDUC. CODE § 8505 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
22 n.14.
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tional program 155 and to examine, at least once a term, the man-
agement, needs, and conditions of the schools.' 56
The failure of students to learn is clearly the risk against
which the above-described educational statutes were enacted to
protect. Like the statutes involved in Ramos157 and Bradford,1
58
the educational statutes allegedly violated in Doe are designed to
benefit a special segment of the community, school-age children,
rather than the general public-a prerequisite to recovery under
this theory. 5 9 The requirements of section 815.6, therefore,
would appear to have been met in Doe, subject, of course, to
problems of proof. 60
The common law also recognizes the principle that negli-
gent failure to perform a statutory duty gives rise to a cause of
action in tort to recover for injuries caused by the negligence, if
the person injured was a member of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted and the injury was of a type which the
statute was enacted to prevent. 16 1 According to one court, "The
disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a
tort."1
62
The Restatement (Second) of Torts maintains that although a
court will not find that a statutory provision designed to secure a
benefit to the general public creates a duty of reasonable care, an
individual may maintain an action in tort on the basis of the
statutory violation if he suffers a harm distinct from that suf-
155 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8002 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
22 n.13.
156 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1053 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
22 n.13.
The plaintiff in Doe also suggested that compulsory attendance statutes give rise to a
"duty" by the school to provide minimally competent instruction, the violation of which
gives rise to tort liability. E.g., CAL EDuc. CODE § 12154 (West 1975); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 76, § 1 (Supp. 1975). See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6; cf. Serna v. Portales
Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.
1974); Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The plaintiff further
suggested that if there is no such "duty," the compulsory education statutes may be
unconstitutional. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 17; cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Other arguments made by plaintiff based on a constitu-
tional right (state and federal) to education are beyond the scope of this Comment.
Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 37-39; see Ratner, supra note 12.
157 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971).
156 36 Cal. App. 3d 16, 111 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
159 See Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288, comment c at 31 (1965).
160 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
61 See, e.g., Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 288 B, 286.
162 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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fered by the rest of the community. 163 The harm suffered by the
students of an incompetent teacher is obviously of a different
type from that suffered by the general community.
b. Intentional Tort
Under some circumstances, a student may be able to recover
for failure to learn under an intentional tort theory, akin to
intentional infliction of mental distress.164 Suppose, for example,
that a high school English teacher, with preconceptions about
the limited educability of his ghetto students, decides not to
teach them literature but instead distributes comic books or third
grade reading matter. Suppose that a high school science teacher
with a similar appraisal of his students decides that there is no
reason for them to learn chemistry and spends the term trying to
inculcate passivity, deference, and good behavior. Depending on
the teacher's state of mind, this behavior might be characterized
as an intentional tort. 165 Although intentional denial of an edu-
cational benefit is beyond the present boundaries of tort law, it is
a harm at least as demonstrable and as deserving of redress as
intentionally inflicted mental distress. Because the law of inten-
tional torts is probably more elastic in the recognition of new
kinds of injuries than is the law of negligence, 66 an intentional
tort theory provides a promising legal framework for a suit of
this type, where the facts permit its use.
A plaintiff also might present a case of this type as an inten-
tional infliction of mental distress. If the claim is, for example,
that the teacher intentionally humiliated a student, the case is
not especially difficult 67 but is clearly different from the kind of
suits contemplated by this Comment. If it is argued that mental
distress resulted from the intentional denial of educational
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288, comment c at 31 (1965); see Stang v. City
of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
286, 288 (1965).
I64 See Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926); W. PROSSER, supra
note 25, § 12, at 49-62.
165 The intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile
intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a result
which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law will not sanction.
The defendant may be liable although he has meant nothing more than a
good-natured practical joke, or has honestly believed that he would not injure
the plaintiff, or even where he was seeking the plaintiff's own good.
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 12, at 31.
166 "In this respect, the law is clearly in a process of growth, the ultimate limits of
which cannot as yet be determined." Id. 50.
167 See Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
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benefits,1 68 it is unclear whether this claim puts the case within
the existing case law. Representing the denial of educational
benefits as not merely analogous to but in itself constituting the
intentional infliction of mental distress, however, may make the
argument seem less radical and more familiar and persuasive to
a court.
c. Misrepresentation
In some situations, a student-plaintiff may be able to seek
recovery on theories of negligent or intentional misrepresenta-
tion. Assume that a teacher issues a satisfactory progress report
about a student who the teacher knows or should know is not
progressing satisfactorily. (Standardized test scores, for exam-
ple, indicate that the student is reading far below grade level.)
The student's parents seek confirmation of the report from the
teacher, explaining that they will obtain remedial instruction if
their child is not making satisfactory progress. The teacher, to
dissuade the parents from speaking to his or her superior re-
garding such instruction, reassures them of the student's satisfac-
tory performance; as a result of the teacher's reports, the stu-
dent never receives remedial instruction.
This factual situation seems to satisfy Prosser's enumeration
of the elements of a cause of action in deceit:
1. A false representation made by the defendant....
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant
that the representation is false-or, what is regarded as
equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of informa-
tion to make it....
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to re-
frain from action in reliance upon the misrepre-
sentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the
part of the plaintiff, in taking action or refraining
from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such
reliance. 169
In some jurisdictions, a negligent misrepresentation also
may give rise to tort liability. A representation made without
168 Complaint, supra note 4, at 8-9.
169 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 685-86 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Connelly v. State, 3
Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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knowledge of its falsehood is negligent if the defendant did not
take reasonable care to ascertain its truth. °70 The necessary duty
of reasonable care in ascertaining the truth1 1 can easily be
found in the student-teacher relationship 172 or in statutes requir-
ing the teacher to give accurate evaluations of students'
achievement. 173 The teacher's knowledge that the parent will
reasonably rely on the representation should also be sufficient to
establish a duty of reasonable care.'7 4 The requirement that the
plaintiff's reliance and his actions based on that reliance be
reasonable seem easily satisfied in this context.
7 5
Misrepresentations of opinion are generally not a basis for
relief, 17 6 and it is debatable whether a student's progress report
is a statement of fact or opinion. Even assuming that it is merely
a teacher's opinion, however, there are exceptions to the general
rule where special circumstances make it reasonable for the
plaintiff to accept and act in reliance upon the statement: where
reliance is justifiable, where the opinion implies that the defen-
dant knows of no facts which would preclude the opinion and
knows facts which justify it, or where the defendant holds him-
self out as having special knowledge of the matter which is not
available to the plaintiff.'77 A student's progress report written
by a teacher seems to fit all these exceptions.
Other situations which could give rise to a misrepresentation
action include the following:
(1) Parents trying to decide whether to send their child to public
or private school ask public school officials about the quality of
the public schools. The school officials, who know or should
know of the poor quality of the public schools, assure the parents
that their school offers high quality education. The student, pre-
viously an outstanding performer, falls to a low level of achieve-
ment, as measured by standardized tests.' 7 8 In the case of a
similar representation by a private school, a claim of deceit or
negligent misrepresentation might be raised to obtain rescission
170 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 107, at 704.
171 Id. 706.
172 "[W]here the representation, although itself gratuitous, is made in the course of
the defendant's business or professional relations, the duty is usually found." Id.
17 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (Supp. 1975).
174 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 107, at 707.
175 See id. § 108, at 714-20.
17 6 Id. § 109, at 721.
177 Id. 726-27.
178 See text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
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of a contract or used as a defense in a suit by the school for
tuition.
17 9
(2) Teachers and school officials who know or should know of
the student's inferior academic ability urge him to switch from
the vocational to the academic course of study, misrepresenting
his abilities to him in order to correct an imbalance between the
two programs. The student switches, performs poorly in the
academic program, and leaves school without vocational skills
and unqualified for a college education.
(3) The teacher negligently or intentionally misrepresents a
student's progress, as a result of which the student is held back a
year. The student sues for loss of a year's income.1
8 0
2. Contract Theories
The law of contracts provides several lines of argument
which might support a suit for failure to learn because of teacher
negligence or incompetence.' 8 ' First, it might be argued that
there are implied contracts between the teacher and the student
and between the school district and the student. An implied term
of the contracts is that the student will be given non-negligent
instruction. 8 2 The consideration for this promise is that the stu-
179 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 105, at 687-89; text accompanying notes 256-63
infra.
180 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 106, at 694-95. Misrepresentation is available to
people other than the student and his parents. Assume that the school issues a diploma
and recommendation, representing (expressly or impliedly) that the student possesses
certain minimum educational skills. An employer relies on these representations and
hires the student, who is illiterate and consequently untrainable. The student makes
serious reading or counting errors which result in a loss to the employer. The employer
might have a cause of action for misrepresentation. See id. For a discussion of the useful-
ness of misrepresentation theories in the private school context, see notes 256-63 infra &
accompanying text.
181 Since American courts have extended tort liability for misfeasance to virtually
every type of contract where defective performance may injure the promisee, a plaintiff
may have the option to sue in tort, contract, or both. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 92, at
617 nn.47-56 & 65; see Wade, supra note 52, at 219 & n.13.
"' See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), in which the court found that by accepting employment to
give legal advice or services, a lawyer impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of professional tasks they undertake; Wade, supra note 52, at 218-19 n.11;
Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 679. See also Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Parris, 243
Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967); Stad v. Grace Downs Model & Air Career School, 65
Misc. 2d 1095, 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Queens County Civ. Ct. 1971). It should be made clear
that this is something distinct from a negligence action in tort, although Prosser points
out that there will be liability in tort for misperformance of a contract whenever there
would have been liability for gratuitous performance without a contract. W. PRossER,
supra note 25, § 92, at 617. The notion of non-negligent instruction is borrowed from the
tort law to "measure" the promise to teach. It is arguable that by holding himself out as a
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dent, in reliance on this implied promise, forbears seeking edu-
cation elsewhere and attends school although, at least in the case
of secondary school students, he could drop out.18 3 An alterna-
tive formulation could be based on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.' 84 It could be argued that the teacher's implied prom-
ise to teach non-negligently or the school district's implied prom-
ise to provide non-negligent teachers was made binding by the
student's detrimental reliance on the promise.
A problem with this contractual theory is the requirement in
some jurisdictions that consideration be "bargained for."'18 5 Even
in such jurisdictions, however, this contract might stand since the
student's attendance in reliance upon the implied promise of
non-negligent instruction was within the contemplation of the
parties. A second problem is the contention that the student's
attendance cannot be consideration, because it is required by
law 1 86 and the student could not have refused to attend. 187 Fur-
thermore, compulsory attendance does not apply to students
above a certain age; finding consideration in attendance by these
students would not be subject to the above-stated objection. Even
for students within the age of compulsory attendance, forbear-
ance from seeking private instruction could be consideration for
the promise of non-negligent instruction or, alternatively, might
bring into operation the doctrine of promissory estoppel.1
88 Of
course a defendant could require a showing that plaintiff would
or might have sought private education if not for the promise
of non-negligent teaching. This possible requirement might
have the anomalous effect of making this contract theory avail-
able only to relatively wealthy students who could have af-
forded private education.
Although the theory of contractual agreements between
student and school district and between student and teacher is
most plausible in the private school context where both the
teacher in certain school districts a teacher is implicitly promising a higher level of
competence than mere non-negligence. Although this approach is distinct from a negli-
gence theory of tort liability, the procedures outlined in this Comment for proving negli-
gence, causation, and damages seem applicable to the various contract actions suggested
in this section.
' 3 SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 53-56, 61 (1970).
18
4 
See id. §§ 99-111.
185 Id. § 53, at 105.
186 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, §§ 1,2 (Supp. 1975).
1'7 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 60.
188 If students are not given competent instruction compulsory attendance may also
be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. See Ratner, supra note 12, at 18.
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promise and the consideration are easily identifiable, 189 it is ap-
plicable in the public school context in certain situations. For
example, assume that a family moves to a new town and the
parents tell the public school principal that they are trying
to decide whether to send their child to public or to private
school. Perhaps they express particular concern about the read-
ing program. After the principal and teachers assure the parents
of the competence of the reading teachers, the parents decide to
send their child to public school, where he is negligently taught.
The contract approach would also be applicable where a high
school student is negligently taught after being dissuaded, by his
principal and teachers, from dropping out of school to get a job
because he believes his teachers are incompetent.190
There is another contract theory upon which a public school
student might base a suit for his failure to learn because of
teacher negligence. The plaintiff could argue that an implied
term of the contract between the teacher and the school district
is that the teacher will teach non-negligently.' 91 The student, as a
third party beneficiary of the contract, should have a right to
recover for its breach by the teacher.'
92
Professors Calamari and Perillo assert that the test of
whether a beneficiary of a contract has a right to enforce it is
whether there is an "intent to benefit" the third party. 93 While a
minority of courts have held that both parties must intend to
benefit the third party, the majority believe that the promisee's
intention is more important. 94 The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts concludes that "intent to benefit" is ascertained by whether
"[t]he beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise
as manifesting an intention to confer a right on him.' 95 Many
189 See Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Parris, 243 Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967). See also
Stad v. Grace Downs Model & Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d 1095, 319 N.Y.S.2d 918
(Queens County Civ. Ct. 1971).
190 The question of damages is discussed at text accompanying notes 19-31 supra.
'"' See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Professional Negligence, supra note 51; notes 94-104 supra &
accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Gorrell v. Greensboro Water-Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328,
32 S.E. 720 (1899); J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 243; cf. Lemon v. Bossier
Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Randall v. Sumter School Dist., 232 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.S.C.
1964), modified, 241 F. Supp. 787 (E.D.S.C. 1965). But see H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
'93J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 244, at 380-81.
19 4 Id. 380.
195 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133, comment d at 288 (Tent. Drafts
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cases have held that if performance runs to the third party, he
will ordinarily be treated as an intended beneficiary with en-
forceable rights. 196 Under any of these approaches, a student is
at least arguably a third party beneficiary with a right to
enforce19 7 the teacher's implied (or express) promise to the
school district to teach non-negligently.1
9 8
In some jurisdictions, the third-party beneficiary theory is
hampered by the doctrine that where a municipal government
contracts with a contractor for the benefit of the municipality's
inhabitants, individual inhabitants generally do not have a right
to enforce the contract. 99 Yet there are exceptions to this rule.
If a contractor agrees to perform services which the municipality
is under a legal duty to provide to specified individual members
Nos. 1-7, 1973); see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 244, at 381. In some
states the rights of third party beneficiaries are set forth in statutes.
'96 J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 244, at 381.
107 In Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), the court recognized that it is essentially a matter of policy
whether defendant (breaching promisor) will be liable to third party beneficiaries.
[T]he determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of
various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was in-
tended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection bet-
ween the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of preventing
future harm.
Id. at 588, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823. The court also emphasized that the
plaintiff would be able to recover as a third party beneficiary under a contract theory,
because the main purpose of the contract was to benefit third parties, and it was the clear
intent of the promisee that the contract benefit these third parties. Id. at 589-90, 364 P.2d
at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
198 If the school district is not vicariously liable, which it might not be since the
teacher's liability would be for breach of contract rather than for tortious acts or omis-
sions, the liability would rest upon the teacher alone. This might jeopardize both the legal
and practical chances of recovering substantial monetary damages at the present time.
Text accompanying note 91 supra. If, however, a precedent of liability were set, it is likely
that teachers would soon carry malpractice insurance as a matter of course, see notes
44-46 supra & accompanying text, and recovery of money damages for remedial instruc-
tion might become a practical possibility. Even though money recovery seems improba-
ble, the student might, under some circumstances, demand specific performance of the
promise of non-negligent teaching. See Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp.
709 (W.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967);
Randall v. Sumter School Dist., 232 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.S.C. 1964), modified, 241 F. Supp.
787 (E.D.S.C. 1965). For example, if the negligence of the teacher consisted of failure to
follow accepted teaching techniques, the court might order the teacher to adopt accepted
methods, e.g., order a reading teacher who failed to give out books to do so. Also, the
student might be able to enforce a contractual term allowing the school board to dismiss
the teacher "for cause."
199 See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 247, at 387. But see, e.g., Gorrell v. Greensboro
Water-Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720 (1899).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:755
of the public, a contractor's improper performance of the con-
tract resulting in injury to these individuals will give them a
cause of action for breach.2 0 0 It has also been held that contracts
into which a governmental unit enters, not just to protect the
public from harm, but to secure advantages to the public, create
rights enforceable by members of the public.20I Because students
are an identifiable class of persons for whose benefit the
teacher's promise of non-negligent instruction is ostensibly
made, and because the municipality is probably under a legal
duty to provide education the students should fall within the
exceptions to the non-enforcement rule.
A contract approach in a suit for failure to learn because of
teacher negligence or incompetence may have several advan-
tages over a tort approach. First, governmental immunities,
which may bar recovery in tort, might not preclude a successful
contract action. 2 Second, courts may be more willing to allow
recovery for loss of an expectancy or benefit in contract than in
tort.20 3 In Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District,20 4 the de-
fendant suggested that recovery for the injuries alleged in that
suit would be possible in a contract action, although he denied
the existence of a contract upon which to base an action.205
Third, defenses such as contributory negligence or assumption
of risk may bar recovery in tort but not in contract. Finally,
actions in tort and actions in contract may be governed by dif-
ferent statutes of limitations, the statutes generally being shorter
for tort actions.
20 6
On the other hand, recovery under some theories of con-
tract damages may be limited to the damages tacitly agreed upon
by the parties-perhaps payment for remedial instruction to
confer the benefit denied by the teacher-while recovery in tort
may extend to a wider range of damages, for example, loss of
future income.20 7 Furthermore, the tort law is more flexible and
more hospitable to novel lawsuits than the law of contracts. Ul-
200J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 247, at 388.
20I Id. 389 & nn.64-68.
202 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 92, at 619; see notes 70-75 supra & accompanying
text.
203 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 92, at 619. But see Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); W.
PROSSER, supra note 24, § 93, at 623.
204 No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st
Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975.
205 Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 4.
206 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 92, at 618.
2 07Id. 619.
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timately, the desirability of proceeding in tort, contract, or both,
will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.
3. Mandamus
If the court refuses to recognize a tort or contract theory, a
plaintiff might seek relief by petition for mandamus. If this ap-
proach is available at all, however, it could only be used in a very
limited number of situations.
A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a person to
perfom a duty imposed on him by law.208 Mandamus is most
often used to compel an official to take action of a non-
discretionary or "ministerial" nature.20 9 Although it can also be
used to compel an official to exercise his discretion, 210 it will not
compel him to exercise that discretion in a particular manner,
unless the official's prior discretionary action was arbitrary or
unreasonable.2 1 ' Other requirements for use of mandamus (de-
pending on the jurisdiction) are a clear legal right in the
plaintiff212 or a clearly prescribed official duty in the perfor-
mance of which the plaintiff has an interest,213 and the inade-
quacy of other legal remedies.
21 4
In education cases, mandamus has been used to compel
school officials to perform ministerial duties21 5 and exercise
discretion. 16 In some cases courts have reviewed discretionary
actions of school officials under an "arbitrary and unreasonable"
standard.2 1
7
Suppose that a state statute clearly directs school officials to
hire teachers with certain qualifications, and an official hires a
teacher without those qualifications. Mandamus might be used to
enjoin the official from rehiring that teacher. The remedy might
also be available to halt the practice of graduating students who
fail to obtain the minimum level of reading competence required
208 See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
209 See, e.g., Shirey v. City Bd. of Educ., 266 Ala. 185, 94 So. 2d 758 (1957).
2 10 E.g., Martin v. Garnet Valley School Dist., 441 Pa. 502, 272 A.2d 913 (1971);
State ex rel. Knudsen v. Board of Educ., 43 Wis. 2d 58, 168 N.W.2d 295 (1969).
2 11 E.g., Gustafson v. Wittersfield Twp. High School, 319 I11. App. 255, 49 N.E.2d
311 (1943); Martin v. Garnet Valley School Dist., 441 Pa. 502, 272 A.2d 913 (1971).
212 See, e.g., Martin v. Garnet Valley School Dist., 441 Pa. 502, 272 A.2d 913 (1971);
Wenders v. White Mills Indep. School Dist., 171 Pa. Super. 39, 90 A.2d 318 (1952).
213 See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
214 E.g., Shirey v. City Bd. of Educ., 266 Ala. 185, 94 So. 2d 758 (1957).
2 15 Id.
216 See, e.g., cases cited note 210 supra.
217E.g., State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (C.P.
1962); Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
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by statute for graduation.218
Notwithstanding the usefulness of mandamus in these lim-
ited cases, it is unlikely that a court in a mandamus action would
order dismissal of a teacher deemed competent by school offi-
cials, or would compel officials to take a particular remedial
action. Nor would mandamus provide a route for requiring
compensation for lost earnings. The limited extent to which
the remedy can be used to challenge official policies and deci-
sions of a discretionary character severely impairs its efficacy;
it does not serve the function of the tort or contract cause of
action.
D. Problems of Proof
1. Proof of Causation of Harm
The first question likely to be provoked by the suggestion of
a cause of action for the failure of students to learn because of
teacher incompetence is that of proof: How can a plaintiff prove
that a teacher's negligence caused his failure to learn? A method
of proof that relies on inferences drawn from circumstantial evi-
dence is essential in this type of case. 219 If an individual student
alleges that his failure to learn was due to the incompetence or
negligence of his teacher[s], it perhaps seems impossible to prove
that the substandard result was not the consequence of the stu-
dent's own lack of intelligence, aptitude, diligence, attitude, am-
bition, or general educability.22 ° This obstacle to plaintiff's proof
of causation can be avoided if the plaintiff undertakes a com-
parative method of proof.
a. The Comparative Method
Under this method of proof, the plaintiff establishes causa-
tion by proving that a class of which he is a member performed
significantly worse than did classes identical in all essential re-
218 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8573-75 (West 1975).
219 See Lubell v. Nyquist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1968), appeal
denied, 23 N.Y. 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D
& comment b at 157-58 (1965); cf. Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Cal. 2d 681, 394 P.2d 697, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 881 (1964). But see Wade, supra note 52, at 228, stating, "There is no indication of
application of ... res ipsa loquitur to attorney-negligence cases."
220 Of course, a student with a high intelligence, documented diligence, and a record
of achievement in other courses might be able to establish that his failure to achieve high
standardized test scores in a subject was due to the negligence or incompetence of his
teacher, since he could eliminate the other possible causes. For less "ideal" students,
however, this approach would not be available.
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spects except that they were not taught by the defendant
teacher. The class of which the plaintiff is a member ("plaintiff
class") can consist of the students of a particular teacher in one
year or over a number of years, or students who have completed
an entire reading or math program in one year or over a
number of years. The causal effect of a teacher on the educa-
tional achievement of his or her students can be isolated by com-
paring the performance of the plaintiff class with the perfor-
mances, in the same subject, of students in the same or similar
communities, in schools of the same socio-economic composition,
similar size and per-student funding, in classes of similar size,
with the same IQ groupings, or other characteristics identified
by experts as determinants of educational success (comparison
classes). 221 By holding constant these factors, which could have
determined the educational success of the student class, the ef-
fect of the teacher on student performance can be proven.222
The plaintiff would introduce expert testimony that the com-
parisons have, in fact, held constant all the factors, other than
teacher quality, relevant to the performance of a class of
students.223 Class performance could be measured by the aver-
age of the differences between scores on achievement tests taken
by each student upon entering and leaving the teacher's class. 22 4
Suppose that at the beginning of the school year students of
teacher A read, on the average, at the third-grade level. At the
end of the school year they read on the fourth-grade level. Stu-
dents of teacher B, who have the same "essential characteristics"
(enumerated above) as the students of teacher A, begin the year
22
1 See McComIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 202, at 485 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCon icK]; C. JENCKS, supra note 11.
222 See MCCORMICK, supra note 221, § 202 at 485; C. JENCKS, supra note 11. Various
authorities support the use of circumstantial evidence to prove both cause in fact and
negligence. In Lubell v. Nyquist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S. 2d 961 (1968), appeal
denied, 23 N.Y. 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969), a teacher's qualification for license as
chairman of a high school English department was determined by a "teaching test" in
which the teacher's performance was apparently judged by the performance of the stu-
dents on achievement tests. This test assumes that the students' test performance was, to
a measurable extent, "caused" by the conduct of the teacher. Res ipsa loquitur has also
been used to establish negligence and cause in fact in medical malpractice cases. E.g.,
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). Moreover, according to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[niegligence and causation, like other facts, may . . . be
proved by circumstantial evidence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment
b at 157 (1965).
223 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment d at 152-59 (1965). See
generally, C. JENCKS, supra note 11.
224 In a first-year course there would, of course, be no entering test scores. In that
situation, however, we could hold constant performance in related subjects and assume a
zero entering score for all classes.
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reading on the third-grade level and finish the year at the 3.2
grade level. Because the only relevant factor that varied between
the groups was the teacher, it can be argued that the perfor-
mance differential was due to differential teacher input.
The probative value of the comparison might be increased
by a presentation of the performances of the defendant teach-
er's classes over a number of years. A showing that the perfor-
mance of the plaintiff class is not significantly different from
that of all of the defendant's classes strengthens the inference
that the performance differential between the plaintiff class
and the comparison class is attributable to the teacher, rather
than to the plaintiff class's abnormality.
22 5
b. Objections to the Comparative Method
Although the intergroup comparison permits the inference
that the .test score differences are due to different teacher
input,2 2 6 the defendant may raise several objections to plaintiff's
presentation. The defendant may argue the comparison has
failed to hold constant a factor, other than teacher performance,
which could have produced the differential test results. For ex-
ample, the plaintiff class may have been abnormal for a group
with the essential characteristics held constant in the comparison.
Absent a showing that the defendant's classes have performed
uniformly poorly over a multi-year period,2 2 7 the showing of
comparatively poor test performance may indicate either that
the inferior group was abnormal-perhaps the class had an un-
usually high number of troublemakers-or that the teacher was
incompetent.
The possibility that the test score differentials were caused
by something other than different teacher inputs, however,
should not eliminate the availability of the comparative tech-
nique to the plaintiff in making a prima facie case. In view of the
obvious difficulty of identifying comparison classes with all pos-
sible characteristics identical to those of the plaintiff class, once
225 While a consistently inferior showing by defendant's students strengthens the
claim that the teacher was the cause, such a showing may not always be essential or
possible, as in the case of a first-year teacher or a previously competent teacher who
becomes senile.
Although the method of proof outlined above would lend itself most readily to a
class action suit, it is available to the individual plaintiff. For a discussion of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a class action suit, see note 23 supra.
226 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment n at 165-66 (1965). See
generally McCoRmicK, supra note 221, §§ 336-47.
227 Such a showing would be impossible in the cases of the incompetent first-year
teacher and the elderly teacher who was competent until the present school year.
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the classes are shown to share the characteristics enumerated
above, they should be presumed to be comparable in all other
respects. The defendant should be permitted to rebut this pre-
sumption with evidence of the abnormality of the plaintiff class,
for example, through the testimony of the principal that this was
the worst behaved class he has seen in twenty years of school
administration. 228 It would then be for the jury to decide
whether it was the teacher or the troublemakers who made the
difference.
Although the defendant might point out that some studies
suggest that teacher quality does not have a very great effect on
achievement test scores,22 9 and that some of the other factors
previously mentioned are more significant determinants of
test-measured success, this technique would allow comparative
measurement of whatever influence a teacher does have on test
scores. The disagreement among authorities regarding the de-
gree of correlation between test scores and cognitive skills,
teacher quality, or economic success 230 should not be crucial.
The judge or jury will simply have to choose among conflicting
expert opinions. As in antitrust cases, where the courts must rely
on highly imperfect and debatable methods of proving cause
and damages, 231 perhaps test scores, though imperfect, are the
best available indicators of how much students have learned
under different conditions. Yet to the extent that courts remain
unconvinced that poor test scores indicate the failure of students
to learn fundamental skills, it is clear that a suit of this type,
proven with the methods herein outlined, will not have a great
likelihood of success.
The comparative technique might also be criticized for sug-
gesting that an entire class was "harmed," while, in fact, the top
or bottom ten percent may have performed better than they
would have performed in comparison classes. For example, the
teacher may have taught to the best or worst students and ig-
nored the rest. Under the negligence standard developed in this
Comment,23 2 however, it is questionable whether a teacher
would be deemed negligent if a significant proportion of his or
her students performed outstandingly. Even if some students
did better with this teacher than they would have done in the
228 See Lubell v. Nyquist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1968), appeal
denied, 23 N.Y. 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969).
129 E.g., C. JENCKS, supra note 11.
230 See, e.g., id.
231 See Sax & Hiestard, supra note 40, at 886-87.
2 Text accompanying notes 94-104 supra.
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comparison classes, there is no reason not to give a remedy to
the students who suffered an educational loss. A comparative
analysis broken down, for example, by IQ groups within a class,
would permit identification of the "injured" groups for purposes
of deciding who should receive remedial instruction.
c. Proof of Causation of Harm on an Individual Basis
If "cause in fact" and "harm" are proven on a class basis,
relief in the form of remedial instruction or dismissal of an in-
competent teacher could be awarded without a showing of harm
to each individual student. If compensation is sought for di-
minished future earnings, however, the individual student prob-
ably must prove that he or she suffered harm because of the
teacher's negligence.
Depending on the availability of the necessary data, the
comparative method might be used to prove that an individual
student's failure to learn was "caused" by the negligence of his
teacher. Consider the following hypothetical. While performing
an operation, a doctor negligently performs a certain procedure
and the patient dies. Assume that when this operation is prop-
erly (non-negligently) performed, there is a two percent chance
that the patient will die. When this particular act of negligence is
committed, there is a fifty percent chance of death. Presumably
there would be no objection to allowing a jury to find that the
negligence of the doctor was the "cause in fact" of the patient's
death. Even though there is some possibility that the patient
would have died even if the doctor had not been negligent, it is
more likely than not that the patient would not have died "but
for" the doctor's negligence. 233 Although the doctor may rebut
the presumption created by the statistics by proving that the
patient was among the two percent who would have died in a
non-negligent operation, the possibility that without the doctors
negligence the patient would still have died 234 does not preclude
a verdict for the patient.
This principle may be applied to education by isolating, in
both the plaintiff and comparison classes, those students with the
233 The preponderance of the evidence standard usually applied in civil cases is,
according to McCormick, proof that leads the jury to find the existence of a contested
fact more probable than its non-existence. McCoRMICK, supra note 221, § 339, at 794
n.56.
234 This possibility exists in many tort cases. In the typical case of the plaintiff's
slipping on a wet floor that the defendant negligently failed to mop, the possibility that
plaintiff would still have fallen if the floor had been dry does not of itself make proof of
cause impossible.
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individual plaintiff's essential characteristics, and comparing the
performance of those sub-classes. Suppose that in the compari-
son classes an average of ninety percent of the students with the
same essential characteristics as the plaintiff progressed at least
one grade level in reading in the fifth grade. In the plaintiff
class, only forty percent of the students with the plaintiff's essen-
tial characteristics advanced at least one grade level. The plain-
tiff failed to advance a grade level in reading (and perhaps was
held back a year). Because the teacher is the only causal factor
not held constant between the two sub-classes, it can be inferred,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the different
achievement rates are attributable to differential teacher input.
While it is possible that the plaintiff would not have progressed
at least one grade level even if he had been in one of the com-
parison classes, it is more likely than not that, but for the
teacher's negligence, the plaintiff would have advanced at least
one grade level.
235
Perhaps the plaintiff should be required to introduce evi-
dence that he is a typical or average member of the plaintiff
sub-class-that there is no reason to place him within the ten
percent who would have failed to progress at least a grade level
even with a non-negligent teacher. For example, he might pro-
duce evidence that his behavior, diligence, and attentiveness
were at least average for students with his "essential characteris-
tics." This showing should at least create a rebuttable presump-
tion or permit the inference that, "but for" the teacher's negli-
23 5 See MCCORMICK, supra note 221, § 339, at 794; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 328 D, comments d & e at 158-59 (1965).
This more-likely-than-not determination may be derived as follows: Since 10% of
those in the comparison class with plaintiff's essential characteristics (the "comparison
sub-class") failed to advance one grade level, that percentage of those in the plaintiff class
with plaintiff's essential characteristics (the "plaintiff sub-class") in excess of 10% who
failed to advance one grade level was caused by the defendant teacher's input. Accord-
ingly, since 40% of the plaintiff sub-class failed to advance one grade level, the fail-
ure of 30% (=40%-10%) of the plaintiff sub-class to advance one grade level was
caused by the input of defendant teacher. The probability that the failure of a stu-
dent in the plaintiff sub-class to advance one grade level was caused by the defendant
teacher is the number of students in the plaintiff sub-class whose failure to advance
one grade level was caused by the defendant teacher divided by the number of stu-
dents in the plaintiff sub-class who failed to advance one grade level. Thus, the proba-
bility that a given student's failure to advance one grade level was caused by the de-
fendant teacher is 75% (30% X number of students in plaintiff sub-class = .75). Since
k40% x number of students in plaintiff sub-class
75% is greater than 50%, it is more likely than not that the failure of one of those in
the plaintiff sub-class who failed to advance one grade level was caused by the defen-
dant teacher's input.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:755
gence, the plaintiff would have advanced at least one grade level.
The defendant could, of course, rebut this presumption with
evidence that the plaintiff probably would not have advanced a
grade level even if the teaching had been non-negligent because,
for example, he was absent often. This method of proving causa-
tion of harm to the individual student does not provide a less
precise indication of what would have happened "but for" the
defendant's negligence than does reliance on general "world ex-
perience" in more usual negligence cases.
236
236 A problem with this method of proof arises when the standard of harm is not
fixed. In the above example it was assumed that the minimum level of advancement was
failure to advance one grade level. Suppose, however, that in the plaintiff sub-class 80%
of the students failed to advance at least 1.2 grade levels while 40% of the students failed
to advance at least 1.0 grade level. Assume further that 30% of the comparison sub-class
failed to advance at least 1.2 grade levels while 25% of the comparison sub-class failed to
advance at least 1.0 grade level. Under these circumstances, the probability that the
failure of a student in the plaintiff sub-class to advance at least 1.2 grade levels was
caused by the teacher is 62.5%. The probability that the 'failure of a student in the
plaintiff sub-class to advance at least 1.0 grade level was caused by the teacher, however,
is 38%. Therefore, although it is more likely than not that a student's failure to advance
1.2 grade levels was caused by the defendant teacher, it is more likely than not that a
student's failure to advance 1.0 grade level was not caused by the defendant teacher. In
such circumstances the choice of the minimum level of advancement with reference to
which the harm will be identified-the choice between failure to advance at least 1.0 and
1.2 grade levels in this example-is crucial, and thus susceptible to manipulation.
If, fortuitously, the percentage of students in the comparison sub-class failing to
advance beyond each level remains in a constant proportion to the percentage of stu-
dents in the plaintiff sub-class failing to advance beyond each respective level, this prob-
lem is guaranteed not to arise. More realistically, even if the proportion is not constant, it
may not vary sufficiently to change the more likely than not determination. Suppose, for
example, that 80% of the plaintiff sub-class failed to advance at least 1.2 grade levels,
40% of the plaintiff sub-class failed to advance at least 1.0 grade level, 30% of the
comparison sub-class failed to advance at least 1.2 grade levels, and 10% of the compari-
son sub-class failed to advance at least 1.0 grade level. Although the probability that the
defendant teacher caused the failure of a student in the plaintiff sub-class to advance 1.2
grade levels is 62.5%, while the probability that the defendant teacher caused the failure
of a student in the plaintiff sub-class to advance 1.0 grade level is 75%, in both cases it is
more likely than not that the teacher was the cause. If the plaintiff can establish harm
due to teacher inputs over most of the range of progress levels, he might succeed in
making out a prima facie case even when results conflict between any two levels.
237 See notes 94-104 supra & accompanying text. The statistically determined average
worst performance in comparison classes would naturally be the product of perfor-
mances above and below the average, all of which represent the worst performances in
each class or program in the comparison classes, including performances which might be
found negligent. If graphed, these performances might appear approximately as a nor-
mal curve with the mean being the standard of minimum professional competence for
communities of comparable essential characteristics. Teachers whose performances fall
above the mean will not be found negligent even though their performances are the
worst in their respective schools. Arguably, because of the imperfection of measurement,
teachers whose performances are clustered just below the mean should not be found
negligent. Teachers whose performances fall in the extreme tail of the curve below the
mean would clearly be negligent. The point "significantly" below the mean at which
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2. Proof of Negligence
a. The Comparative Method
The comparative method outlined above does not establish
teacher negligence; it establishes only that the quality of a
teacher's performance is inferior to that of the teachers of com-
parison classes. To establish negligence, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant's performance is worse than that of the min-
imally acceptable teacher in the same or similar communities. In
light of the comparative method of proof, this definition of neg-
ligence may be translated into the following standard: A teacher
is negligent if it is proven that his or her performance falls
significantly below the average worst performance of teachers in
comparison classes identical in all essential respects with the
plaintiff class.237
One method of proving that the defendant teacher's per-
formance falls below this standard relies on an inference of the
existence of an unobserved fact from proof of the existence of
an observed fact. The inference, similar to that employed under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,238 is that one teacher's students
do not perform significantly worse than the average worst per-
formance of other teachers' students identical in all essential re-
spects unless the individual teacher's performance is below the
average worst performance of teachers in the community.239
Given this inference and standard of negligence, negligence may
be established by proof that the performance of the plaintiff
class falls significantly below the average worst performance
of the comparison classes. Medical malpractice cases provide
ample authority for proving negligence by circumstantial evi-
dence. 40
Suppose that in a ghetto school over a ten-year period, the
first-year French classes of teacher A have averaged in the fifth
percentile on year-end achievement tests. Average scores in indi-
vidual years ranged between the fourth and sixth percentile. In
the comparison schools, the students of the worst teachers have
performance becomes inexcusable would have to be determined in the courts through
litigation. Although policy would play the major role in the fixing of this point, a plaintiff
might strengthen his case by showing, when the requisite data is available, that
defendant's performance is more than one or two standard deviations below the mean.238 See sources cited note 219 supra.
239 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, commentsf & g at 160-62 (1965).
240 See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); W. PROSSER, supra
note 25, § 39, at 226-28; see note 222 supra. But see Olson v. North, 276 Il1. App. 457,
(1934); Wade, supra note 52, at 228 & nn.67, 68.
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averaged in the fifteenth percentile and the comparison groups
overall have averaged in seventeenth percentile. Unless it is
shown that these test results were "caused" by a factor other than
teacher input, it reasonably could be concluded that the per-
formance of teacher A failed to meet minimum professional
standards.
b. Lack of Certification
The extent to which lack of certification 2 4 1 should be inde-
pendent evidence of a teacher's negligence is unclear. It has
been suggested that an uncertified or unlicensed professional
should be held strictly liable for injuries caused in the perfor-
mance of a function requiring certification or license. In Biakanja
v. Irving,2 4 2 for example, the defendant, who was not licensed to
practice law as required by statute, was held to be negligent per
se in a suit arising from his drafting of a faulty will. In the
education context, this view implies that an uncertified teacher
would be negligent per se or strictly liable if his classes failed to
obtain the average level of performance for students with the
same essential characteristics.
243
Other authorities suggest that lack of certification is evi-
dence of negligence where injury results from performance of a
function for which certification is required by law.244 Some sup-
port for the application of this theory is provided by Kobylski v.
Board of Education,245 in which a New York court held that the
failure of a teacher to have a valid teaching certificate could
constitute substantial evidence of incompetence in a dismissal
proceeding. This theory could result in finding an uncertified
teacher negligent where he followed the same procedures and
obtained the same results as a certified teacher, who might not
be found negligent.
Perhaps the best view is that of the majority of the New
York Court of Appeals in Brown v. Shyne:24 6 Lack of statutorily
required certification is evidence of negligence only where it is
241 It has been suggested that there is a presumption of competence on the part of a
properly certified teacher. E. REUTrER & R. HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 450. This
presumption, however, must be subject to rebuttal by the kinds of evidence discussed in
this section.
242 310 P.2d 63 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), aff'd in part, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16
(1958).
243 See text accompanying notes 221-24 supra.
244 E.g., Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926) (Crane, J., dissenting).
245 33 App. Div. 2d 603, 304 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1969).
246 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926).
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logically relevant to a showing that the defendant failed to meet
the standard of conduct required of certified members of the
profession-for instance, where the defendant was unable to ob-
tain a certificate because of unsatisfactory practice teaching. The
theories that impose a higher standard on uncertified teachers,
however, may have the arguably desirable effect of discouraging
uncertified people from teaching.
The extent to which lack of certification indicates negligence
by the officials who hired the uncertified teacher is also unclear.
The determination of whether hiring an uncertified teacher con-
stitutes negligence per se, evidence of negligence, or nothing in
itself, might depend on the statutory requirements for hiring
and whether or not the hiring of uncertified teachers should be
discouraged. It may also be asked whether the fact that an in-
competent teacher is certified conclusively proves that the school
district was not negligent in hiring him (apart from possible vi-
carious liability). It can be argued that a school district is acting
per se reasonably where it hires a certified teacher because it can
reasonably rely on the teaching certificate as conclusive proof
that the teacher is minimally competent. While certification may
be a defense against a claim of administrator negligence during
the first year of the teacher's employment, a school district
clearly could be negligent in retaining or rehiring a certified
teacher who performed poorly during the first year. Further-
more, a school district might be found negligent for hiring a
certified but incompetent teacher of whose past or probable in-
competence school officials had knowledge, perhaps from poor
letters of recommendation.
c. Other Types of Proof
Evaluations of a teacher by his or her principal or supervisor
might provide other evidence of teacher negligence.247 If, on the
basis of observation, a principal or supervisor rated a teacher's
performance unsatisfactory, these evaluations might be available
to the plaintiff as evidence of the teacher's negligence or incom-
petence; moreover, if a principal or supervisor rated a teacher
unsatisfactory but failed to dismiss the teacher "for cause" or
rehired the teacher, this would seem to be evidence that the
supervisor or principal was negligent.
As was suggested earlier, 248 the unexcused failure of a
247 See Conley v. Board of Educ., 143 Conn. 488, 123 A.2d 747 (1956), in which a
teacher's supervisor testified about the teacher's shortcomings in a dismissal proceeding.
248 Notes 145-63 supra & accompanying text.
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teacher or school official to conform to statutes or regulations
enacted to protect students against the risk of not learning may
constitute negligence per se or evidence of negligence.249 If, for
example, a teacher failed to follow a school district regulation
requiring that a certain percentage of class time be used for
reading instruction, and the students fell behind their grade
level in reading, violation of the regulation may constitute neg-
ligence per se or evidence of negligence. Failure of a school
official to follow statutorily prescribed hiring criteria also may
constitute negligence per se or evidence of negligence if he hires
an incompetent teacher who causes educational harm to stu-
dents. On the other hand, compliance with statutes and regula-
tions does not preclude a finding of negligence.250
Where a teacher has taken a "teaching test, '' 251 his perfor-
mance on the test might be introduced (along with expert tes-
timony) as evidence of negligence or incompetence. If the
defendant performed well on the test, he might introduce the
results to prove his competence or non-negligence.
Teacher negligence might also be established by evidence
that the teacher did not follow conventional teaching methods,
or at least methods recognized by a substantial portion of the
profession. 252 In Gardner v. State,25 3 for example, the state of
New York was held liable on a negligence theory for injuries
sustained by a student caused by the failure of a gym teacher to
give gymnastic instruction according to customary methods. 25 4
This is not to say, of course, that mere deviation from traditional
teaching methods alone should constitute negligence. 255 If a re-
249 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288 B (1965).
250 Id. § 288 C.
251 See Lubell v. Nyquist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1968), appeal
denied, 23 N.Y. 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969); note 222 supra.
2'52 See notes 94-104 supra & accompanying text.
253 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939). See Keesee v. Board of Educ., 37 Misc. 2d
414, 235 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1962), in which a gym teacher's deviation from a syllabus
was considered evidence of negligence.
254 It has been suggested that an attorney's deviation from customary methods
should constitute negligence if he fails to accomplish the desired objective. Wade, supra
note 52, at 227 & n.58. A recent law review comment, moreover, has contended that a
professional's deviation from established procedures should create a rebuttable presump-
tion of negligence. Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 645; see generally Curran, supra
note 95, at 4-6. A possible objection to using deviation from conventional procedures as
an indicium of negligence is that it might discourage experimentation and restrict de-
velopment of new and better educational methods. For an answer to this objection, see
text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
255 Under some circumstances there may be constitutional problems with requiring a
teacher to follow particular teaching methods. Cf. Webb v. Lake Mills Community School
Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
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spected segment of the educational community recognizes or
adheres to the method, the deviation should not be considered
negligent, even if, in a particular case, students learned less than
they probably would have if taught by conventional methods.
III. PRIVATE EDUCATION
The case of the public school student presents the most
difficulties and has the least chance of success of any suit by a
student who fails to learn because of teacher negligence. The
private school student who fails to learn because of teacher neg-
ligence could use most of the legal arguments and methods of
proof developed in the public school context 256 unencumbered
by several of the difficulties encountered in the public school
suit. Governmental immunity would not bar recovery, although
charitable immunity doctrines might;257 the doctrine of respon-
deat superior is more likely to render the private school liable for
the acts and omissions of its teachers than the public school; and
the existence of a contract upon which to base a breach of con-
tract theory is not at issue. 258 It is even possible in the private
school case that the promise of non-negligent instruction will be
express, either oral or written. If not, it is perhaps easier to find
an implied promise of non-negligent instruction than in the pub-
lic school situation. Furthermore, teacher negligence aside, it
may be possible to find a promise or warranty of a minimum
level of student performance or subsequent educational oppor-
tunity, either expressed in the contract or implied by advertising
or other promotional representations.2 5 9 In the event of breach,
the amount of tuition paid is a measure of damage seemingly
less speculative than any of the damages assertible in the public
school situation.
2 60
A troublesome feature of the private school case is that the
private school is not as effective a risk bearer or distributor as a
256 Obviously, liability could not be based on the kinds of statutes discussed in text
accompanying notes 145-63 supra.
257 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 133.
258 See, e.g., Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Parris, 243 Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967)
(student recovered prepaid tuition for unused lessons because dance studio breached
contract by failing to provide competent instruction); Olson v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 181
Cal. App. 2d 165, 5 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Sciortino v. Leach, 242 So. 2d
269 (La. Ct. App. 1970).259 See Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Parris, 243 Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967). See
generally Note, Developing Protection for the Consumer of Future Services, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
926 (1972).
260 See id.; Olson v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 165, 5 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960); Stad v. Grace Downs Model & Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d 1095, 319
N.Y.S.2d 918 (Queens County Civ. Ct. 1971).
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public entity. While tuition refunds might not cripple the school,
the broader damages discussed in the public school context
might be ruinous. If insurance is available, however, a suit for
failure to learn remains more likely to succeed in the private
than in the public school context. This greater likelihood of
success also applies to suits against private colleges and
universities.
26 1
A student in a professional or occupational training course
also might bring a successful suit to recover for his failure to
learn. For example, a student in a computer repair course would
have a strong contract or tort case if the techniques he was
taught applied only to computers of a type no longer used by
anyone. 262 Problems of proof are clearly less troublesome than in
the public school situation. Damages would not be speculative,
and could encompass not only tuition but provable loss of in-
come if the student gave up a job in expectation of learning a
new occupation. If a technical training course falsely represents
that graduates will find employment, deceit or negligent misrep-
resentation would provide a plausible basis for an action for
tuition refund or more extensive damages.
263
A final possible situation in which a suit for failure to learn
because of teacher negligence could be brought with the legal
theories and methods of proof outlined in this Comment might
arise where a bar review course fails to teach the students the
correct law. An important change in the law, for example, is not
incorporated into the review course. The negligence of the in-
structor seems easily provable.2 64 The comparative methods
could be used to prove cause and harm. Suppose the normal bar
exam pass rate of similarly composed review classes is eighty
percent and the pass rate in the plaintiff's incorrectly instructed
class was thirty percent. Over a ten-year period the lowest pass
rate of any non-negligently instructed class was seventy percent.
Out of a class of one hundred students who took the course, it
could be argued that twenty would have failed even if the in-
struction had been non-negligent, and the failure of the remain-
ing fifty is attributable to the negligent instruction. Thus, all
261 See Paynter v. New York Univ., 64 Misc. 2d 226, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676 (N.Y. County
Civ. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 66 Misc. 2d 92, 319 N.Y.S.2d 893 (App. T. 1971).
262 See Note, supra note 259; cf. Sciortino v. Leach, 242 So. 2d 269 (La. Ct. App.
1970).
262 See Stad v. Grace Downs Model & Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d 1095, 319
N.Y.S.2d 918 (Queens County Civ. Ct. 1971); Brown v. Search, 131 Wis. 109, 111 N.W.
210 (1907); W. PROSSER, supra note 25, §§ 109-10, at 728-36.
264 See text accompanying notes 237-55 supra.
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things being equal, it is more likely than not that the failure of
any particular student was caused by the negligent instruction.
Of course, it would be open to the defendant to prove that a
particular student's failure is attributable to something other
than the negligence of the instruction, for instance, the student's
failure to attend the classes. 26 5 In the case of a homogeneous
group, however, any member of the class could use this method
to establish that, more likely than not, he would have passed "but
for" the negligence of the instructor. In a negligence action,
proximate cause would easily be established, since the risk
created by negligent instruction in a bar review course clearly is
that students will fail the bar exam.
The plaintiff's case might be strengthened by a showing that
he was an outstanding law student who had diligently prepared
for the bar exam. A less outstanding plaintiff should try to show
that he was typical of the group who took the course, that is, that
there is no reason to believe that he was more likely to fail than
anyone else.
Calculation of damages is also easier in this situation than in
the public school context. Beyond tuition refund, the students
who failed the bar exam could be compensated for income lost
while they retook the course and waited for the exam results.
Recovery might also be possible, on a more speculative basis, for
loss of a job because of failing the bar exam. Finally, even those
who passed the exam might be able to recover tuition on a con-
tract theory, because they did not receive that for which they
bargained.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the present time, the problems involved in bringing a suit
for failure to learn because of teacher negligence or incompe-
tence may seem insurmountable. Traditional legal principles,
however, provide ample guidance for fashioning a viable cause
of action.
First, failure to learn is not a harm beyond the law's reme-
dial capabilities. The replacement of incompetent by competent
teachers, the provision of, or payment for, remedial instruction,
and monetary compensation for diminished future income could
"make whole" public school students who have suffered a loss of
educational benefits.
Second, tort law, contract law, and mandamus provide legal
theories on which a suit for failure to learn might be based. A
265 See text accompanying notes 219-36 supra.
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negligence suit stands the most chance of success; various statu-
tory, common law, and scholarly authorities support the conten-
tion that school districts and teachers should be held liable for
the failure of students to learn because of the negligence of the
teachers. The standard of acceptable instruction should be com-
parative, that is, the level of skill and learning of the minimally
acceptable teacher in the same or similar communities. In limited
circumstances, causes of action based on intentional tort or mis-
representation may also be available. Contract law may supply
the public school student with a cause of action if the factfinder
can be persuaded of the existence of implied contracts between
the student and the teacher or between the student and the
school district, with an implied promise of non-negligent instruc-
tion. Although in many cases the contract theory may be less
plausible than the tort theory, the contract approach has several
advantages: Governmental immunity, which may bar recovery in
tort, might not preclude a successful contract action; courts may
be more willing to allow recovery for loss of an expectancy or
benefit in contract than in tort; defenses such as contributory
negligence or assumption of risk may bar recovery in tort but
not in contract; and statutes of limitations are generally longer
for contract actions. A contract theory would, of course, be of
more use to a private school student than to a public school
student. Finally, in narrowly defined circumstances, mandamus
may provide minimal relief.
Third, there are several methods of proving teacher negli-
gence and causation of harm. The latter can be established if
the plaintiff proves that a class of which he was a member
performed significantly worse than did classes identical in
all essential respects except that they were not taught by the de-
fendant teacher. Negligence can be established if the plain-
tiff proves that the teacher's performance fell significantly below
the average worst performance of teachers in classes identical to
the plaintiff's in all essential respects. Lack of certification, a
supervisor's poor evaluations, failure to conform to statutory
educational requirements, and failure to use recognized teaching
methods might provide other evidence of negligence.
The legal framework for a cause of action for failure to
learn is supported by strong policy considerations, including the
importance of education, the ability of teachers and school dis-
tricts to bear or spread the costs of students' failure to learn, and
the desirability of deterring negligent teaching and the hiring of
incompetent teachers.
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The novelty of the theories advanced in this Comment does
not condemn educational malpractice suits to an eternity of sus-
tained demurrers and motions to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. Dean Prosser's tribute to the flexibility of tort
law is an acknowledgement of the dynamism of the common law
generally:
[T]he progress of the common law is marked by many
cases of first impression, in which the court has struck
out boldly to create a new cause of action, where none
had been recognized before. . . . The law of torts is
anything but static, and the limits of its development are
never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff's in-
terests are entitled to legal protection against the con-
duct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is
novel will not of itself operate as a bar to recovery.
266
266 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at 3 (footnote omitted).
